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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALTA FAYE WALKER LAKE and 
LYNN ALVIN LAKE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
No. 14291 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the construction of two written contracts 
which the parties admit and the trial court found to be fully 
integrated. No issues of fact were presented. On non-jury 
trial, the court was called upon only to read and construe the 
contracts. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
The contracts provided for the sale of undivided interests 
in land for a stated initial consideration, paid at the time of 
contract execution, plus additional consideration in the event 
a higher price was paid for similar interests in the same land 
in probate proceedings then pending. The trial court held that 
no price escalating event as contemplated by the contracts had 
occurred and dismissed plaintiffs1 complaint seeking additional 
consideration. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about February 26, 1973, Respondent was undertaking 
to acquire the total fee estate in certain real property (the 
"Tract") located at approximately 7200 South on Ninth East 
Street where a shopping mall was in course of development. 
The Tract was held in undivided ownership as follows (Exhibits 
IP, 2P, 3P and 4P): 
Owner Interest Owned 
Estates of Minnetta and 
Ila Minnetta Walker four-ninths 
Estate of R. E. Walker one-ninth 
Alta Faye Walker Lake one-ninth 
Austin L. Walker one-ninth 
J. B. Walker one-ninth 
Estate of Roma Walker Grock one-ninth 
(Appellant Lynn Lake succeeded 
to the interest of Roma Walker 
Grock as the sole devisee under 
her will) 
In pursuit of its goal, Respondent had submitted offers to 
purchase the interests of the Estates of Minnetta, Ila Minnetta, 
and R. E. Walker at some time before February 26, 1973 (R-58). 
On February 26, Respondent entered into a contract with Appellant 
Lynn Lake which is Exhibit 2P. On the same date Respondent 
executed and transmitted to Appellant Faye Lake a similar con-
tract (Exhibit IP) which she executed on February 28. No issue 
is raised as to the validity of these instruments which will 
herein be referred to as the "contracts". 
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We will comment on specific clauses of the contracts in 
the course of argument. It is sufficient here to note that 
both contracts contemplate that $10,000.00 will be paid to 
the seller in any event and that additional compensation will 
be paid in the event more than $10,000.00 per one-ninth interest 
is paid to the "various Walker estates" in the pending probate 
proceedings. The language of the price escalation clause in 
the Lynn Lake contract, at least, arguably provides for escalation 
only if "competitive bidding" influences the price in the probate 
proceedings. In the Faye Lake contract, Respondent makes an 
unconditional promise to pay whatever price per ninth is eventually 
confirmed. 
Respondent (i.e. either Mr. Vidalakis, one of the partners, 
or Respondent's attorney) prepared both contracts (R-57). 
After the contracts were executed and in effect, these 
were the developments in the probate proceedings: 
A. Estate of R. E. Walker (Exhibit 3P) 
Respondent increased its offer, dealt directly 
with the heirs who consented to sale without hearing, and 
obviated the competitive bidding anticipated when the 
contracts were executed (Exhibit 3P). 
B. Estates of Minnetta and Ila Minnetta Walker 
(Exhibit 4P) 
1. At the hearing on the Petition for 
Confirmation of Sale to Respondent (on the terms of 
the offer pending as recited in the contracts) there 
was competitive bidding, and the court declared J. B. 
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Walker to be the high bidder at a price of $15,200.00 
per net acre, the acreage to be determined by survey. 
There was nevertheless confusion about how "net 
acreage" should be computed. Mr. Walker deposited $92,611.82. 
2. Respondent moved to vacate the sale to J. B. 
Walker on the grounds he was not the high bidder, had 
failed to make his offer in writing, and Respondent 
was the high bidder. 
3. The court vacated the sale to J. B. Walker 
on October 23, 1973. 
4. On October 26, before the time for appeal 
from the order vacating the sale to him had expired, 
J. B. Walker died. 
5. On the basis of waivers and consents by 
the heirs, sale was confirmed at $88,572.08, or 
$22,143.02 per one-ninth interest without further 
opportunity for competitive bidding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN APPELLATE COURT IS NOT UNDER COMPULSION 
TO ADHERE TO A TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION 
OF AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT ; 
It is, of course, an axiom of appellate practice that a 
finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported 
by credible evidence. Where evidence is presented on disputed 
issues of fact, the demeanor, sincerety, and general credibility 
of the witnesses are factors of almost controlling influence, 
— ^  4-VK=> ^ nnellate court has little basis for evaluating them. Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The same considerations do not apply where the function 
of the trial judge was merely to read and construe a written 
instrument recognized to be integrated. In that circumstance, 
witness evaluation is not a component of the adjudicative 
process, and appellate judges are as competent to construe 
language as trial judges. 
The statement of this doctrine appears most frequently 
in decisions of federal courts because there is a specific 
rule (Rule 52, FRCP) which obligates circuit courts of appeal 
to accept trial court findings unless "clearly erroneous". 
Commenting on the application of Rule 52 to a trial court's 
construction of an integrated instrument, Milton Green, in 
his Basic Civil Procedure (University Text Book Series, Foun-
dation Press, 1972), says: 
"There is a federal rule covering this 
situation which states: "Findings of fact shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." This rule was interpreted in Orvis 
v. Higgins* perhaps the most frequently cited 
case on the subject, in which Judge Frank puts 
the whole matter in perspective in the following 
succinct summation: 
In the light of the Gypsum case, we 
may make approximate gradations as follows: 
We must sustain a general or a special 
verdict when there is some evidence which 
the jury might have believed, and when a 
reasonable inference from that evidence 
will support the verdict, regardless of 
whether that evidence is oral or by deposi-
tion. In the case of findings by an admin-
istrative agency, the usual rule is substan-
tially the same as that in the case of a 
*Orvis v. Higgins 180 F 2d 537 
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jury, the findings being treated like a 
special verdict. Where a trial judge sits 
without a jury, the rule varies with the 
character of the evidence: (a) If he 
decides a fact issue on written evidence 
alone, we are as able as he to determine 
credibility, and so we may disregard his 
finding. (b) Where the evidence is partly 
oral and the balance is written or deals 
with undisputed facts, then we may ignore 
the trial judge's findings and substitute 
our own, (1) if the written evidence or 
some undisputed fact renders the credibility 
of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, or 
(2) if the trial judge's findings must rest 
exclusively on the written evidence or the 
undisputed facts, so that his evaluation of 
credibility has no significance, (c) But 
where the evidence supporting his finding 
as to any fact issue is entirely oral testi-
mony, we may disturb that finding only in 
the most unusual circumstances." 
Other cases in which Judge Frank's view has been expressed are 
Rockwood and Co. v. Adams, CA Colo. 1973, 486 F2d 110; Kind v. 
Clark, CCA NY 1947, 161 F2d 36; Seagrove Corp. v. Mount, CA 
Ohio 1954, 226 F2d 62. 
POINT II 
THE ACCEPTED RULES OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE 
THAT THE PRINCIPAL APPARENT INTENT OF THE 
PARTIES BE CARRIED OUT AND THAT, IN SITUATIONS 
WHERE MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING CAN BE 
ASCRIBED TO THE WORDS OF A CONTRACT, THE 
MEANING WHICH DISFAVORS THE WRITER WILL BE 
ADOPTED 
Even where contracts can properly be found to meet the tests 
of integration, their words can be subject to two or more inter-
pretations. In the instant case, Appellants contend that the 
words can only be construed to mean that Appellants would receive 
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as much for their one-ninth interests as did any of the "various 
Walker estates" from which Respondent intended to purchase 
"similar interests" by procedures under which "competitive 
bidding" was possible. 
Respondent, on the other hand, contends for a construction 
of the contract which imposes an obligation to pay additional 
compensation only if the price paid in the probate proceedings 
was the exact price established by a bidding procedure and 
applied uniformly to all of the one-ninth interests (one-ninth 
in the R. E. Walker Estate and four-ninths in the Minnetta and 
Ila Minnetta Walker Estate) for which Respondent had submitted 
purchase offers. 
In situations where two interpretations of language are 
reasonable, there are principles of construction which are 
universally applied. They have been frequently stated in cases, 
texts, and restatements, and should require no general exposition 
here. The two principles we consider to be of controlling import 
here are (1) an interpretation should be given which achieves the 
principal apparent intent of the parties, and (2) that interpre-
tation should be favored which operates most strongly against the 
party who wrote the contract. 
These principles are stated in all the major treatises on 
contracts and in such a profusion of cases that citation should 
be unnecessary. Williston On Contracts, Jaeger Third Edition, 
Volume 4, states the principles as follows: 
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(1) "The court will if possible give effect to 
all portions of the instrument, and an inter-
pretation which gives a reasonable meaning 
to all its provisions will be preferred to 
one which leaves a portion of the writing 
useless or inexplicable." (p. 731) "An 
interpretation which gives effect to the 
main apparent purpose of the contract is 
favored" (p. 733, our emphasis). 
"It is a fundamental rule in the interpre-
tation of agreements that we should ascertain 
the prime object and purpose of the parties, 
and, in case of ambiguity produced by its 
minor provisions, the latter should, if 
possible, be so construed as not to conflict 
with the main purpose. . . . In many cases 
a more stringent rule has been laid down, 
which is that, if the minor provision of the 
contract is irreconcilable with the obvious 
general intent, it would for that reason be 
sacrificed altogether for the promotion of 
the general purpose of the agreement" 
(p. 733, 734). 
(2) Section 621 - Language Will Be Interpreted 
Most Strongly Against The Party Using it 
"Since one who speaks or writes can, by exact-
ness of expression, more easily prevent mistakes 
in meaning than one with whom he is dealing, 
doubts arising from ambiguity of language are 
resolved in favor of the latter, and he will 
ordinarily be the promissee of the promise in 
question; it is sometimes stated that the contract 
if ambiguous, will be interpreted in favor of the 
promise". 
The Restatement of Contracts incorporates these rules of 
construction in Section 236, particularly subsections (b) and 
(d): 
" (b) The principal apparent purpose of the 
parties is given great weight in determining 
the meaning to be given to manifestations of 
intention or to any part thereof." 
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"(d) Where words or other manifestations of 
intention bear more than one reasonable mean-
ing an interpretation is preferred which 
operates more strongly against the party 
from whom they proceed, unless their use 
by him is prescribed by law." 
POINT III 
THE CLEAR INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS TO ASSURE 
APPELLANTS AS HIGH A PRICE FOR THEIR INTERESTS 
AS PROBATE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BRING, AND 
RESPONDENT WROTE THE CONTRACTS 
The two contracts (Exhibits IP and 2P) use slightly different 
but similar language to state the basis upon which Appellants 
would be entitled to receive additional or escalated consideration 
for the property they agreed to sell. In Exhibit IP, the language 
"So that there may be no misunderstanding, I wish 
you to know that I have made a bid for the other 
5/9ths interest in the various Walker estates, and 
although my bid is based on approximately $5,000.00 
per acre, it is possible that at the court confirma-
tion of sale, the price will be improved by competi-
tive bidding. I agree that if an amount in excess 
of $10,000 for each 1/9 interest is paid, whether 
or not the amount is paid by me, I will pay to you, 
as a premium in cash within Sixty (60) days that 
amount that is necessary to make your sales price 
the same as the sales price on the court-confirmed 
sale." 
In Exhibit 2P, the language is: 
"INCREASE IN PURCHASE PRICE -
It is understood that under no circumstances 
will the purchase price decrease, but if the bids 
for similar interests in various walker estates 
are improved by competitive bidding, then we agree 
that if an amount in excess of $10,000 for each 
1/9 interest is bid and paid in the said court 
proceedings covering the 5/9th walker Estate interests, 
then the amount finally paid by us to you hereunder 
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shall become the price paid per 1/9 in said 
court proceedings* We hereby agree to pay you, 
as a premium in cash, the difference between 
$10,000 and the ultimate sales price at the 
court-confirmed sale in the Walker estates." 
One background fact against which the parties negotiated 
is clearly revealed by the language employed; Respondent had 
submitted offers to the Walker estates which all parties 
expected to be the subject of petition for confirmation of 
sale under circumstances where competitive bidding would be 
possible. Since the offers had been accepted and were merely 
awaiting the preparation of petitions for confirmation, the 
only event which Appellants could anticipate to have a price 
escalating influence was competitive bidding. Appellants 
were clearly reluctant to sell before the value-setting effect 
of that bidding procedure could be perceived, and Respondent 
assured thera they would receive as much as the estates received. 
The language Dr. Vidalakis and his attorney employed did 
not obviously (whatever might have been in their minds at the 
time) contemplate what the effect of Respondent's circumventing 
competitive bidding would be. Indeed, Respondent's representa-
tion that competitive bidding opportunity would be afforded is 
sufficiently strong so that its circumvention by Respondent was 
arguably a violation of the agreement. The very foundation of 
the bargain was that the influence of competitive bidding would 
be given free play. 
Appellants were not obliged to rely on Respondent's post-
contract negotiations with the Walker estates as contract 
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violations, however, because there was competitive bidding, 
it did result in a higher price than $10,000.00 per ninth's 
being paid for interests in the Tract. 
The trial court construed the contracts to provide for 
a price escalation only if (1) the final price paid and con-
firmed by the probate court was the same in the R. E. Walker 
Estate proceeding as in the Minnetta, Ila Minnetta Estate pro-
ceeding and (2) the estates' interests were in fact sold to the 
high bidders at the high bid. Neither contract so provides. 
Let us examine the two contracts separately. 
A* The Lynn Lake Contract 
The Lynn Lake contract provides that "if the bids in 
various Walker estates are improved by competitive bidding, 
then. . . . the amount finally paid by us to you hereunder 
shall become the price paid per 1/9 in said court proceedings". 
It does not provide that the final transaction in the probate 
proceedings has to be a sale to the highest bidder at the highest 
bid price. It is enough to effectuate the escalation clause 
that the amount paid for each.one-ninth interest is "improved 
by competitive bidding". 
It is perfectly obvious that, except for competitive bidding, 
Respondent would have purchased all the one-ninth interests at 
$10,000.00 per ninth, the amount of his offers which were the 
subject of the probate proceedings. 
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We submit that the trial court took a strained and contorted 
view of the contract language in holding that the price paid per 
ninth to the Walker estates was not improved by competitive bid-
ding. The price Respondent paid was just enough below the amount 
deposited by J. B. Walker to dissuade the Executor from appealing 
the order vacating the sale to J. B. Walker after his death* 
B. The Faye Lake Contract 
In the Faye Lake contract, Respondents promise is not 
tied to competitive bidding in any way. The language includes 
a recital that "it is possible. . . . the price will be improved 
by competitive bidding", but the promise is not conditional upon 
the means by which the price is increased. This is the language 
of the promise: 
"I agree that if an amount in excess of $10,000 
for each 1/9 interest is paid, whether or not the 
amount is paid by me, I will pay to you, as a pre-
mium in cash within Sixty (60) days that amount 
that is necessary to make your sales price the 
same as the sales price on the court-confirmed 
sale." 
CONCLUSION 
This lawsuit presents a pure language construction problem. 
The only issue is whether events occurred which effectuated the 
price escalation clauses of the contracts. If the language is not 
fully reflective of the parties1 intent, the deficiency is charge-
able to Respondent, the author. Obviously the main purpose of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 13 -
the escalation clauses was to assure Appellants as much per 
ninth as anyone else was paid for a similar interest. The 
trial court's construction frustrates the purpose of the escala-
tion clauses and otherwise violates accepted rules of construction 
and common sense. 
This court is under no compulsion to adhere to the trial 
courtfs interpretation of the contracts, and should reverse 
with appropriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
Mailed copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Nick 
J. Colessides, Attorney for Respondent, Suite 202 - 610 East 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, postage prepaid. 
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